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Chapter Summary 
 
Philosophers of religion writing in the “analytic” tradition have 
commonly countered the logical problem of evil or the evidential 
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argument from evil by maintaining that an omnipotent and good God 
permits apparently gratuitous suffering for the sake of some greater good, 
experienced in this world and/or in a life after death. Philosophers of 
religion writing in the “continental” style have argued that there is no 
possible good which could compensate for the quantity and intensity of 
suffering experienced by sentient creatures, often exemplified by the 
suffering of the Jews at Auschwitz. Nevertheless, for these scholars, 
religion is a resource that can support us in the struggle to prevent and 
alleviate the suffering of others, and to accept and live meaningfully with 
the suffering that we ourselves experience.   
 
Philosophers writing in the continental style during this period (1950-
2010) are a disparate group, membership of which may be disputed, but, 
broadly speaking, they adopt two strategies in addressing the problem of 
suffering. First, in order to avoid the apparent conflict between the 
existence of an omnipotent, benevolent deity and gratuitous suffering, 
they re-vision the concept of God, replace God with a God-like religious 
ultimate such as Being, Nature or Good, or claim that God is beyond 
Being. Secondly, they suggest several ways in which religion can help 
humankind to meet the challenge of evil. In arguments reminiscent of 
those offered by analytic philosophers, some suggest that we could not 
have the experiences which we regard as good in a world which lacks the 
possibility of great suffering or that evil is an unfortunate by-product of 
evolution; for philosophers writing in the continental style, however, it is 
not an omnipotent and good God who permits this and good does not 
necessarily overcome or outweigh evil. Responses to the suffering of 
others include struggling to overcome our own sinfulness and compassion 
for “the other” accompanied by moral action. The latter sometimes 
enables us to perceive transcendent dimensions of human existence, 
 3 
dimensions which help us to transcend our own individual concerns and 
thus to accept our own suffering. Some scholars also recommend spiritual 
exercises that aim to liberate us from concern for ourselves by focussing 
our thoughts on that which is universal, or suggest that it is the finite 
nature of our existence that enables us to appreciate the incommensurable 
value of every moment of our lives.  
 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Introduction 
 
i. Continental and analytic philosophy 
 
“Continental philosophy” may be defined as a philosophical method or 
style of writing which is derived from the thought of scholars originating 
in continental Europe such as Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud,  
Heidegger and the Parisian thinkers of the 1960s and 1970s (Goodchild 
2002: 14). Broadly speaking, it is characterized by a literary style which 
aims to deconstruct common ways of thinking in order to show how these 
might be ethically and/or spiritually disadvantageous and to recommend 
new ways of thinking which might lead to better ethical and/or spiritual 
outcomes (Trakakis 2007: 26, 29, 39, 40). It contrasts with philosophy in 
the “analytic” tradition, which is usually said to derive from the thought 
of Frege, Moore and Russell, and employs methods analogous to those of 
scientific inquiry, proposing hypotheses and theories and testing these in 
the light of relevant data. Arguments are often formalized in order to 
assess their deductive validity or inductive strength and are evaluated for 
their explanatory power, simplicity and fit with background knowledge 
(Ibid., 6, 32, 34-35).  
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ii. The problem of evil in analytic and continental philosophy 
 
Since the 1970s, analytic philosophers have distinguished between two 
forms of the problem of evil: the logical problem of evil, and the 
evidential argument from evil. The logical problem claims that theists 
hold contradictory beliefs (belief in a God who is omnipotent, omniscient 
and good, and belief that there is evil in the world), while the evidential 
argument admits that it might be possible to solve the logical problem by 
positing a reason why God allows some evil but claims that the intensity 
or quantity of evil makes God’s existence improbable.  
 
Many explanations for why God permits even apparently gratuitous 
suffering have been offered but most of these are variations on the themes 
“that evil is useful or necessary to a greater good or that eventually, 
whether in time or eternity, evil will be overcome or transformed by a 
greater good” (Long 2007b: 140). Non-theists have argued that there is no 
possible good which could compensate for some of the extremes of evil 
experienced by human beings: in the twentieth century, the suffering 
perpetrated by the Nazis in the Second World War death camps, most 
notably Auschwitz, is the archetypal example but there have been many 
more – e.g., in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Bosnia (Bernstein 2002: 1). 
Philosophers of religion working in the continental tradition usually agree 
that the world contains suffering which is not compatible with the 
existence of an omnipotent and good divinity. For example, Emmanuel 
Levinas (1906-1995) argues that, whereas suffering in oneself might be 
seen as an “adventure”, suffering in the Other is unpardonable (1988: 
374); indeed, justifying our neighbour’s pain is “the source of all 
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immorality” (Ibid., 378). Nevertheless, these scholars regard religion as 
an important resource for the struggle to prevent and alleviate suffering in 
all its forms. Indeed, Donald A. Crosby argues that “the menace of evil is 
a central, if not the central problem with which all religions must wrestle. 
This problem goes a long way toward explaining why there is a need for 
such a thing as religion in the first place” (2008: xi). In outline, these 
scholars offer two kinds of approach to the problem: First, in order to 
avoid the apparent conflict between the existence of an omnipotent, 
benevolent deity and gratuitous suffering, they re-vision the concept of 
God, replace God with a God-like religious ultimate such as Being, 
Nature or Good or claim that God is beyond Being. Secondly, they 
suggest several ways in which religion can help humankind to meet the 
challenge of evil. 
 
The nature of divinity 
 
i. Rejecting divine omnipotence 
 
Hans Jonas (1903-1993) argues that, in the light of Auschwitz, it is no 
longer reasonable to believe that the divine attributes of intelligibility [the 
claim that God’s nature may be understood, at least in part, by 
humankind], absolute goodness and omnipotence are compatible with the 
world as we know it. Since Judaism cannot sacrifice intelligibility or 
goodness, the existence of evil is compatible with divine goodness only if 
God is not omnipotent. We could say that God simply chooses not to 
exercise divine omnipotence in order to preserve the autonomy of 
creatures, but this is inadequate because one would expect a good, 
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omnipotent God to intervene when creatures inflict intense suffering on 
each other. But there were no miracles at Auschwitz – except those that 
were brought about by human beings. There were no divine interventions 
because God was unable to intervene (Jonas 1996: 139-140).   
 
ii. A ‘becoming’ God 
 
Jonas also argues for a ‘becoming’ God – that creation changes God’s 
own state because God is no longer alone, and that God’s relation to the 
creation means that God’s experiences change as the world changes. 
Jonas argues that the concept of divine becoming offers a better fit with 
the spirit and language of the Bible than the Hellenic concept of a God 
who is transtemporal, impassible and immutable (Ibid., 137).   
 
This idea is developed by David Ray Griffin (1939-), for whom it is 
derived from process philosophy. Griffin argues that the world was 
created from chaos, rather than nothing, and thus that creative power is 
inherent in the world. This means that “the creatures’ twofold creative 
power of self-determination and efficient causation cannot be cancelled, 
overridden or completely controlled by God” (2001: 224). Thus,  like 
Jonas, Griffin argues that God’s power is limited; although God is all- 
powerful in the sense of being the supreme power and having all the 
power it is possible to have, this does not entail that God can prevent all 
evil (Ibid.). 
 
iii. God as ‘Being’ 
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Both Paul Tillich (1896-1965) and John Macquarrie (1919-2007) draw on 
Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) concept of Being as a means to 
understand the concept of God, while John A. T. Robinson (1919-1983) 
and Eugene Thomas Long draw on Tillich and Macquarrie, respectively. 
Tillich defines “Being” as the ground of everything which has movement 
and becoming; it is “living creativity” which eternally conquers its own 
non-being (1952: 43). Robinson follows Tillich in arguing that God is the 
“Ground of all our being” (1963: 53), by which he means that God is the 
ultimate reality (Ibid., 55), and that this is what underlies our experiences 
of love (Ibid., 49, 52-53, 61).  
 
For Macquarrie, God is “holy Being”, Macquarrie’s clarification of the 
Heideggerian doctrine which emphasizes that, while Being is not “a 
being” – “God”, as traditionally understood – (holy) Being “tends to 
replace God and draws to itself the attributes traditionally ascribed to 
God” (1966: 106). Long suggests that our sense of dependence on Being 
is expressed in the doctrine of creation, understood not as a theory about 
how the world began but, in Macquarrie’s “existential-ontological” 
interpretation, as an account of what it means to be a creature, of how we 
are to understand our being in the world (Long 2007b: 144). Long claims 
that, for Macquarrie, “Being is the condition that there may be any 
beings, the letting-be, or perhaps better, the grace, the giving, the loving 
of being” (Long 2007b: 145); it transcends every being, but participates 
in or is manifest in every being. In creation, Being involves itself “in the 
risk of the temporal order of possibility and change in which the unity of 
Being and beings is constantly threatened” (Ibid., 145-146).  
 
iv. God and Nature 
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Robinson claims that all natural things and processes are faces of God, 
and thus that God is “in” both sunsets and cancer (Robinson 1967: 115). 
This seems to conflict with his claim that the ultimate Ground of our 
being is love (1963: 49, 52-53), but Robinson also argues that, in all the 
processes of nature, there is a love to be met which cannot finally be 
defeated (Ibid., 115); in other words, for those who make the response of 
love, it is possible to meet in all circumstances, no matter how difficult, 
“the graciousness of a Thou capable of transforming and liberating even 
the most baffling and opaque into meaning and purpose” (Ibid.). 
Robinson uses his final sermon, “Learning from Cancer”, to illustrate 
this. While he does not believe that God sent or caused his cancer, he says 
that the experience has proved to be one of “grace and truth” in that it 
enabled much love, kindness and goodness to be disclosed which might 
never otherwise have come to light (1987: 191).  
 
George D. Chryssides compares the theologies of scholars such as Tillich 
and Robinson with the concept of the Tao, “a force pervading the 
universe which cannot be resisted, a force which of necessity flows 
through the universe and within the individual self in the way it does” 
(1987: 474). For Chryssides, God is identified with the Tao and is “the 
source, guide and goal of all that is”.1 Like Robinson, Chryssides argues 
that “God is love”, which is “to state that the source of one’s intentions 
and actions should be a compassionate one, that one be guided by the 
principal of universal love, and, particularly, that the goal which one 
seeks to attain is a goal of harmony, love and justice” (475). The universe 
has a benevolent source, its events can be guided by both natural and 
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human goodness and it can be “continually directed towards a final goal 
in which famine, disease and conflict will have no further place” (Ibid.).   
 
John Shelby Spong (1931-), too, claims that all natural things and 
processes are faces of God but for Spong, unlike Robinson and 
Chryssides, this means that evil is “part of the Ground of Being, the 
nature of reality, the meaning of God” (2001: 167). Thus, being made in 
God’s image means acknowledging that every person has a “shadow” (an 
idea borrowed from Carl Jung), “that aspect of our being which is feared, 
repressed, denied, coped with, and in some cases even transformed to 
serve the well-being of the person” (Ibid., 166); for Spong, both Jesus and 
Judas have been mythically present since the dawn of creation (Ibid., 
168).  
 
Crosby dispenses with the divine altogether and substitutes religious 
naturalism, defined as “the view that nature is metaphysically ultimate 
and that nature or some aspect of nature is religiously ultimate” (2008: 
ix); there is no supernatural realm in which a supernatural being or beings 
reside (Ibid., x). He argues that evils cannot be explained away but that 
we may find in nature “the splendor, dynamism, and rejuvenating powers 
of the natural world” and in ourselves as creatures of nature “reliable 
sources of both sustaining and demanding hope, purpose, and value for 
the living of our lives” (Ibid., xi). 
 
v. God and the Good 
 
Iris Murdoch (1919-1999) rejects both the classical concept of God and 
“attempts to extend the meaning of our word ‘God’ to cover any 
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conception of a spiritual reality”; the latter, she thinks, give rise only to 
“useless confusion” (1992: 419). She argues, instead, that religion should 
be understood as “the passionate love of the Good” (Ibid., 326) and 
defines the Good as “an active principle of truthful cognition and moral 
understanding in the soul ... a ‘reality principle’ whereby we find our way 
about the world” (Ibid., 474). On this view, evil may be overcome by 
means of attention to or contemplation of the Good since this enables us 
to discern both general moral principles and the right course of action in 
each situation in which we find ourselves (Ibid., 475). Murdoch argues 
that we can know that the Good exists because the world contains many 
images of imperfect goodness and from these we can construct a 
hierarchy of goodness which points towards perfect Good (Ibid., 394).  
 
vi. God beyond Being   
 
Whereas the philosophers considered thus far maintain that the divine, or 
a substitute for the divine is, itself, goodness or love, or that goodness or 
love are at least part of the reality which may be thought of as divine, 
Levinas rejects the notion that there might be “a widespread, invisible 
goodness in Nature and History, where it would command the paths 
which are, to be sure, painful, but which lead to the Good” (1988: 375). 
For Levinas, God is neither essence, substance nor Being because it is not 
possible to describe God’s ontological status; God is not “a term” but 
“Infinity” (1992: 250, quoted in Davis: 1996: 98). Neither is God to be 
described in negative terms, since “even negative theology turns out to be 
too positive. Saying what God is not permits the indirect characterization 
of what God is and thereby falls back into immanence and ontology” 
(Davis, 1996: 99). Thus, God is “transcendent to the point of absence” – 
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not the supreme Other, but “the absent condition … of the encounter with 
the Other” (Ibid.),  
 
Meeting the challenge of evil 
 
i. Evil as a necessary corollary of good 
 
In an argument reminiscent of those offered by analytic philosophers, 
some philosophers writing in the continental style suggest that we could 
not have the experiences which we regard as good in a world which lacks 
the possibility of great suffering; for continental philosophers, however, it 
is not an omnipotent and good God who permits this, and good does not 
necessarily overcome or outweigh evil.  
 
Some argue that the nature of the world is such that the creative process 
cannot exist without decay and suffering (Cottingham 2009: 147; see also 
Long 2007b, 146), and that it would be incoherent to wish that God had 
created a different world (Cottingham 2003: 57). Indeed, Buddhism 
teaches that suffering is one of the marks of existence – one of the 
fundamental characteristics of everything in the world (Ibid., 62). 
Nevertheless, a greater capacity to experience suffering in such a world is 
also associated with a greater capacity for experiencing good. As 
Cottingham points out, plants do not suffer but they also lack 
consciousness (2009: 147), and Macquarrie suggests that, “without the 
threat of nullity and frustration, there could be little development of 
selfhood” (1966: 237; see also Crosby 2008: 28, 32). Even death is 
necessary for the evolution and continuation of human life (Crosby 2008: 
59). Similarly, a greater capacity to cause suffering is also associated with 
 12 
a greater capacity for great achievements; Griffin argues that the freedom 
which led to achievements such as those of Jesus, Gautama, Mozart or 
Madame Curie could not have existed without the freedom to create “the 
evils of slavery, genocide, pollution, and the extermination of entire 
species for sport or profit” (2001: 229).  
 
But Macquarrie also admits that, even if some evil is educative, “much 
that seems excessive, wasteful, and just senseless remains” (1966: 237). 
Here, he thinks that we must simply acknowledge that “these are loose 
ends that are not integrated into the main creative process or into God’s 
providential act, side effects, as it were, which arise inevitably and which 
have to be risked” (Ibid.).  
 
ii. Evil as a by-product of evolution 
 
The notion that evil is an unfortunate by-product of the evolutionary 
process is developed by Spong, who argues that the evils manifested in 
“tribalism, war, conquest, slavery, apartheid, segregation, the second-
class status of women, and the significant hostility toward homosexual 
people” (2001: 157) can be explained by the sense of incompleteness 
which human beings have experienced in their development from simple 
to complex forms of life, and their struggle to obtain that which is 
perceived to be lacking in order to survive; they are “manifestations of a 
humanity that is still a work in progress” (157). He claims that our quest 
for survival also explains “the mob spirit” which occurs when a crowd of 
people generate an emotional frenzy leading to violence – as in the 
Chrystal Night, which began the Nazi persecution of the Jews, lynch 
mobs in southern USA, and riots at sporting events. These, he says, are 
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simply corporate expressions of “the individual and social need for power 
or the recognition of the rightness of a particular cause that reaches a 
psychotic edge” (Ibid., 158).  
 
Spong also considers evils which are not easily explained by 
incompleteness – “ addiction to alcohol and drugs, mental disorders, 
those who destroy others in the service of their convictions, and those 
who, seeking love in what is for them a natural way, find only death” 
(Ibid., 164). These he explains by means of the idea that every person has 
a ‘shadow’, mentioned earlier. Sometimes, our being is consumed by our 
shadow and a rescue is required, but this is the role not of the theistic 
God, but of the people of God; healing occurs by means of “the love that 
accepts us as we are, shadow included, and says that every part of who 
we are is made in the image of God” (Ibid., 169). For Spong, the main 
purpose of a faith community is to create wholeness – “to be the place 
where each person can be nurtured into being” (Ibid.).  
 
iii. Evil and compassion for the other 
 
The idea that we must struggle to overcome our own moral shortcomings 
and show compassion for others’ suffering is a common theme. Gordon 
D. Kaufman (1925-2011) argues that faith in God consists, first, in our 
discernment in our world of “movements and momentums toward a more 
human and ecologically sustainable order of life”, secondly, in our hope 
that these are evidence of “a deeply grounded trajectory along which 
human history is moving and may continue to move”, and, thirdly, our 
commitment to this hope and the possibilities which it offers for all life 
on earth (1993: 373). This faith “requires that we do all we can to help 
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break the power of those momentums of evil which corrupt our common 
life, our selves, and our world” (Ibid.). So, faith is “essentially an ongoing 
struggle with the sin and evil in ourselves and our world” (Ibid.). Spong, 
too, sees in the processes of life “the hints of a new being that is always 
struggling to emerge in our lives” (2001: 170). This new being is the 
dimension of humanity which escapes the survival drive and gives itself 
to enhance the lives of others; it is a manifestation of selfless love. In the 
Christian tradition, Christ is an image of a new humanity that is 
characterised by selfless love; in Christ, humanity is “so whole that it 
fades into divinity” (Ibid.). Similarly, Crosby argues that, in our battle 
with evil, the sources of our greatest hope “are the capacity for and 
impulse toward goodness that lie within each of us” (Crosby 2008: 111). 
We may not be fundamentally good by nature, but  
 
we have a powerful potential to be good if we can learn to act in 
accordance with our deep … sense of moral obligation, 
responsibility, and opportunity … Religious faith, including a 
religion of nature, can motivate, encourage, and inspire us to build 
upon this capacity for and tendency toward moral goodness in 
ourselves and to work together for their actualization and 
incorporation into our institutions and societies (Ibid.).   
 
As we saw above, Levinas rejects the idea that the notion of “a 
widespread, invisible goodness in Nature and History” which commands 
the paths that lead to the Good might enable us to find meaning in events 
such as the Holocaust (1988: 375). Nevertheless, following Emil 
Fakenheim (1916-2003), he argues that it remains important that the Jews 
continue to live as Jews, because to renounce their God and the ethics of 
the Bible would be to complete Hitler’s work (Ibid., 378). Levinas applies 
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this to the whole of humanity (Ibid., 379) and suggests that humanity 
must now, in a faith without theodicy, appeal to each person’s 
compassion, a form of suffering inspired by others’ suffering2 “which is a 
non-useless suffering (or love), which is no longer suffering ‘for nothing’, 
and which straightway has meaning” (Ibid.). Levinas concludes that 
useless suffering can only be understood in the context of “my 
responsibility for the other person, without concern for reciprocity, in my 
call to help him gratuitously” (380).   
 
The dominant response to the existence of radical evil in the thought of 
Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) is similar to that of Levinas. He claims that 
religion must be understood as a response to the other, and that this 
implies a responsibility to give ourselves to the other (2002 section 33: 
71). Derrida differentiates between the “religion of cult alone”, which 
seeks divine favours but teaches only prayer and desire, rather than 
action, and “moral religion”, which is concerned more with good conduct 
than with knowledge of God, and is concerned with salvation only in 
respect of what human beings must do in order to be worthy of it. The 
latter is a “reflecting faith”, which does not depend on historical 
revelation but agrees with the rationality of practical reason, and is 
opposed to a “dogmatic faith”, which “claims to know and thereby 
ignores the difference between faith and knowledge” (Ibid. section15: 
49). While religion can sometimes be a force for evil – for example, from 
time to time the Abrahamic faiths try to impose their views on the whole 
of humanity and/or fail to see the evil which is carried out in their name 
(Ibid. section 37: 78-79) – true religion involves both absolute respect for 
life and sacrifice (Ibid. section 40: 86). Although there will never be an 
agreed definition of “religion” (Ibid. section 34: 72-73), a demand is still 
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made of us (Ibid. section 35: 76). Derrida advocates the messianic 
without messianism; the messianic does not belong to any Abrahamic 
religion and is not prophesied or expected, but takes the form of peace or 
justice in response to the needs of the other, despite the ever-present 
possibility of evil and death (Ibid. section 21: 56).  
 
iv. Evil, love and transcendence 
 
Long argues that suffering can evoke “a sense of the precariousness of 
existence …[which] is part and parcel of what it means to be” (2007b: 
143) and that this can lead us to experience dependence on Being, or holy 
Being, the condition that there may be beings (Ibid., 145). He suggests 
that it is Being which calls us to show “love and compassion for others 
which at times at least seem to transcend the dimensions of any morality 
of mere calculation” (Ibid., 147). In giving Being in response to suffering, 
human beings participate in the creative activity of Being. This calling of 
beings to their fullest being in relation to others is the essence of divine 
reality – divine reality is in this calling – and this is a source of hope, or a 
kind of redemption (Ibid.).  
 
Long admits that not everyone will see in their experience of suffering 
transcendent dimensions of human experience, and some may recognise 
these without connecting them with religion. But perhaps some “may find 
within the experience of suffering evidences of or pointers to a wider 
range of reality which is understood to be in some sense fulfilling of life 
and the ground of belief in the meaning and worth of existence” (Ibid.) – 
in other words, a philosophical faith.  
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Long’s argument may, perhaps, be amplified by means of an argument 
from Crosby, who suggests that encounters with evil “can sometimes be 
events of grace that give us new insight into the sufferings of the world 
against which our paltry daily frets and worries pale into insignificance. 
Such encounters can reorient our values and motivate us to attend to what 
we recognize as important” (2008: 82). Three of Siddhartha Gautama’s 
“Passing Sights” were transformative encounters with natural evils – 
disease, old age, and death – in response to which he began a religious 
search, which led to enlightenment and Buddhahood (Ibid.).  
 
The giving of oneself to others through moral activity as a means by 
which one is able to overcome one’s own afflictions is also found in the 
writings of Murdoch, who recommends that one should make “a spiritual 
use of one’s desolation” (Murdoch 1992: 503). And Crosby argues that, 
in his version of religious naturalism, it is selflessness, expressed by 
means of “the contributions one can make before one dies to present and 
future generations of living beings”, rather than the everlasting survival 
of one’s individual self which is of supreme importance (2008: 9).  
 
 
v. Being and acceptance 
 
Our sense of the precariousness of our existence, then, can give rise to a 
sense of dependence on Being, and this may call us to moral action that 
transcends that which a calculated morality might require. Thus, 
acceptance may lead to moral action, and this, in turn, may enable 
acceptance.  
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The theme of acceptance is developed in the writings of Tillich. He 
differentiates between fear, which has an object which can be “faced, 
analysed, attacked, endured” (1952: 44) and conquered by love (Ibid., 
45), and anxiety which has no object, which means that struggle and love 
with respect to it are impossible (Ibid.). Fear is “being afraid of 
something, a pain, the rejection by a person or group, the loss of 
something or somebody, the moment of dying” (Ibid., 46), whereas 
anxiety is “the anxiety of ultimate non-being” (Ibid., 47); the root cause 
of anxiety in any situation is the anxiety of being unable to preserve one’s 
own being (Ibid.). Tillich argues that there are three kinds of anxiety: 
anxiety about fate and death, anxiety about emptiness and loss of 
meaning, and anxiety about guilt and condemnation. He suggests that, in 
each case, anxiety is addressed by means of courage which is rooted in 
the power of being, a power that transcends one’s own power, the power 
of one’s world, and the power of the threat of non-being which is the 
cause of the anxiety.  
 
Tillich claims that every example of courage has a religious root, whether 
acknowledged or not, because religion, or faith, is not the affirmation of 
something which is uncertain but “the existential acceptance of 
something transcending ordinary experience … It is the state of being 
grasped by the power of being which transcends everything that is and in 
which everything that is participates” (168; see also 152-153, 167). There 
are no valid arguments for God’s “existence”, but “there are acts of 
courage in which we affirm the power of being” (175). Providence is not 
a theory about the nature of divine activity, but “the religious symbol of 
the courage of confidence with respect to fate and death. For the courage 
of confidence says ‘in spite of’ even to death” (163).  
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Tillich claims that absolute faith has three characteristics:  
 
1. The experience of the power of being, which is present “even in the 
most radical manifestation of non-being” (170);  
 
2. Acknowledgement that the experience of non-being and 
meaninglessness depend upon the experience of being and meaning so 
that, even when one despairs, one has enough being to make despair 
possible, and when one accepts meaninglessness, this is itself a 
meaningful act, an act of faith (170-171).  
 
3. The acceptance of being accepted. Although there is nobody who 
accepts, “there is the power of acceptance itself which is experienced” 
(171). Although doubt deprives faith of any concrete content, the power 
to accept acceptance remains and is “the source of the most paradoxical 
manifestation of the courage to be” (171).   
 
Echoes of the “doctrine of acceptance” may be seen in the work of 
Chryssides, Crosby, and Murdoch. Chryssides argues that, while God’s 
power is not an infinitely magnified version of human power, “there is an 
ultimate ‘will of God’ within the physical world and within the self, 
which it is possible to accept or reject. The true devotee is the one who 
accepts this will and does not futilely attempt to impose his own will on 
the God who pervades the universe” (1987: 474). Crosby suggests that we 
have to accept that there is a dark side of nature that “will eventually 
bring about our deaths, the deaths of all those we love, and the final 
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dissolution of all we have striven to accomplish” (2008: 107). Our task is 
therefore to find the courage to live in spite of this (Ibid.). In times of 
sorrow, Murdoch argues, “we must hold on to what has really happened 
and not cover it with imagining how we are to unhappen it”; in other 
words, we must accept the situation without wishing it were different or 
trying to make it so, especially by seeking revenge (1992: 503). So, she 
says, “Do not think about righting the balance, but live close to the 
painful reality and try to relate it to what is good” (Ibid.). Crosby suggests 
that, while we cannot resolve the ambiguities of nature, “we can be fellow 
sufferers who understand” and that we can support each other, even if 
only by means of silent presence or simple symbolic actions such as 
making a cup of tea (2008: 108).   
 
vi. Spiritual exercises and self-transcendence 
 
Some scholars also recommend spiritual exercises to liberate us from 
concern for ourselves and inspire moral action. For example, Murdoch 
recommends that we focus our attention on anything or any person that 
might “attract love and revive hope”. She suggests that “[t]he inhibition 
of unworthy fantasies is perhaps the most accessible discipline …There 
may be a place here for the idea of effort of will. This sort of asceticism 
can of course be an everyday matter, practised at various levels, as when 
one guards one’s tongue or expels bad thoughts” (1992: 503). Crosby, 
too, suggests that the resourcefulness, dedication and commitment that 
we require to help us come to terms with the aspects of life over which 
we have no control can be strengthened by spiritual practices such as  
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regular meditation; repentance for past failures and weak resolve; 
aspiring in one’s heart to do good and to find ways to do so 
effectively; giving fervent thanks for all the good things of the 
world; preparing oneself to be open and responsive to events of 
grace; searching for strength in oneself and in fellowship with others 
for encounters with systemic and moral evils; reaching out to help 
others – especially humans and nonhuman creatures most in need of 
our assistance and concern – and thereby focusing less intently upon 
oneself and one’s own needs and desires; finding instruction and 
inspiration in the lives and teachings of exemplary moral and 
religious persons; and participating actively in the collective rituals, 
traditions, teachings, stories, songs, and work of religious 
communities that are sympathetic with, supportive of, or at least not 
inimical to the outlook of religion of nature (2008: 106).  
 
Like Murdoch, Pierre Hadot (1922-2010) draws on the Platonic tradition, 
arguing that the Platonic spiritual exercise which aims to separate the 
body and the soul should be understood not as an attempt to achieve a 
trance-like state but as an attempt to transcend the individuality and 
passions which are associated with the body so that we can see the world 
from the perspective of universality and objectivity (1995: 94-95). From 
this perspective, our human concerns seem insignificant and it is this 
which enables us to remain serene when we experience misfortune (Ibid., 
96).  
 
Even the study of physics can be seen as a spiritual exercise with three 
levels. First, the contemplation of nature offers the soul “joy and 
serenity” and liberates it from everyday worries (Ibid., 97); Philo speaks 
of those who practice wisdom as, although attached to the earth by their 
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bodies, providing their souls with wings, which enables them to “take no 
notice of ills of the body or of exterior things” and who, “rejoicing in 
their virtues, make of their whole lives a festival” (Philo Judaeus, On the 
Special Laws, 2, Chapters 44-46; quoted in Hadot 1995: 98). At the 
second level, physics assists the soul to view the world as if from above, 
in the light of which the concerns and disputes of human beings seem of 
little consequence (Ibid., 98-99). At the third level, physics enables us not 
only to breathe with the air which surrounds us but to think with the 
Thought which embraces all things, by embracing with our thought the 
whole Universe and ever-continuing Time (Marcus Aurelius, 
Meditations, 8, 54; 9, 32; quoted in Hadot 1995: 99). At this level we die 
to our individuality. Hadot suggests that, for Plato, the person who has 
tasted the immortality of thought “cannot be frightened by the idea of 
being snatched away from sensible life” (Ibid., 95). 
 
vi. Finitude and the value of each moment 
 
Finally, Hadot also draws on the thought of Epicurus to argue that the 
finite nature of our existence enables us to appreciate the infinite value of 
every moment of our lives. For the Epicurean, each moment “surges forth 
laden with incommensurable value” (Ibid., 95-96). If we believe that each 
new day will be our last, then we will “receive each unexpected hour with 
gratitude” (Horace, Letter, I, 4, 13-14; quoted in Hadot 1995: 96; cf. 
Robinson 1987: 192). Michael Mayne (1929-2006), in a reflection on a 
prolonged period of illness, cites Kierkegaard who, asking how Christ 
was able to live “without anxiety for the next day” when he must have 
known that his ministry would end in death, suggests that Christ “had 
Eternity with him in the day that is called today, hence the next day had 
no power over him, it had no existence for him” (Kierkegaard, 1961: 322; 
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quoted in Mayne 1987: 49). Mayne suggests that this chimes with the 
teaching of Jean-Pierre de Caussade (1675-1751) about “the sacrament of 
the present moment”. This attitude to life is, however, difficult to achieve, 
especially in the midst of suffering. Here, Mayne draws on writers as 
diverse as Meister Eckhart (c1260-1327) and Dennis Potter (1935-1994). 
For Eckhart, holiness “consists in doing the next thing you have to do, 
doing it with your whole heart, and finding delight in doing it” (Mayne 
1987: 49), while Potter suggests that, during activities such as playing 
games, singing, or dancing, we are unaware of any moment except the 
present one (Mayne 1987: 50).   
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Since space does not permit a detailed assessment of the responses to the 
problem of suffering examined in this chapter, a few remarks must 
suffice.   
 
First, as Long observes, those who object to theodicies often seem, 
themselves, to be offering alternative explanations for the existence of 
apparently gratuitous suffering. Thus, their misgivings are concerned not 
with theodicies as such, but with the nature of those theodicies (2007b: 
142) – theodicies which endeavour to show that, from the perspective of 
an omnipotent deity, even the most horrendous evils can, in some way, be 
justified.  
 
Second, in none of the views examined is God, or a substitute for God, 
omnipotent in anything which resembles the classical sense. At best, there 
is “an ultimate ‘will of God’ within the physical world and within the 
self, which it is possible to accept or reject” (Chryssides 1987: 474), or 
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God/ Nature provides a source of power on which we can draw in our 
struggle with sinfulness and suffering (Crosby 2008: xi).  
 
Third, God, or a substitute for God, is always to some extent good, but 
interpretations of this vary. Broadly speaking, they may be divided into 
two groups: i. Those who think that the divine is a symbol for the perfect 
goodness that underlies natural processes, but must be discovered and 
promoted. ii. Those who think that the divine is the totality of that which 
exists, and is therefore both good and evil; thus it is the duty of 
humankind to recognise the potential for good and, drawing on the 
world’s resources, to work to transform that potentiality into actuality.  
 
Fourth, the reasons for rejecting analytic approaches to the problem of 
evil and the reasons for adopting alternative models of God and goodness 
with their related responses to the challenge of suffering are 
predominantly pragmatic. But how does one choose between these 
positions on pragmatic grounds? It might be argued that few of them are 
mutually exclusive. Even the apparent conflict between interpretations of 
the divine as the goodness which underlies perceived reality and 
interpretations of the divine which encompass both good and evil might, 
perhaps, be resolved by noting that, since they both require us to seek and 
promote goodness, there is little practical difference between them. Thus, 
one must choose from within the group of theodicies which are judged to 
be neither ethically nor spiritually disadvantageous those which most 
effectively promote both human and animal flourishing. Even if our 
understanding of the nature of human and animal flourishing differs in 
some respects from age to age,3  it is the value of that flourishing which 
remains constant.  
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Finally, it is sometimes claimed that, unlike philosophers writing in the 
continental tradition, analytic philosophers simply follow an argument 
where it leads without any concern for the personal contexts of real 
human beings (Trakakis 2007: 27, 30). This is, perhaps, unfair, since, if it 
is possible to ascertain what is and is not the case, this might make a 
significant difference to what one believes about the nature and purpose 
of the world and its creatures, and to the life one attempts to live within it. 
Nevertheless, it might interest the reader to know that this chapter was 
written while undergoing and recovering from eight months of treatment 
for a grade 3 cancer. As a patient on an oncology ward, I experienced the 
dark tunnel and white light which is often described by people who report 
near death experiences, there have been many months of not knowing 
whether I would survive, and the future still looks far from certain. Thus, 
the questions examined here were wrestled with on both a personal and a 
professional level. Trakakis suggests that it is “not the prerogative of the 
observer or bystander” (2008: 30) to assign meaning to another’s 
suffering, and others’ interpretations of my experience were sometimes 
indeed, while kindly meant, unhelpful. One of the least helpful responses 
was the bland exhortation to “be positive”. Although an allegedly 
definitive explanation for my suffering along with a perfect strategy for 
dealing with it would not have been appreciated, the most effective 
supporters were those who merely suggested possible ways in which I 
might be enabled to come to terms with and respond to my situation. For 
me, the most useful of these were those which helped me to direct my 
attention away from myself and towards the world and all its creatures, 
and to engage in activities, such as meditation and the playing of music, 
which allowed me to focus on and appreciate each present moment. As 
Cottingham suggests, faith offers not a solution to the problem of evil but 
“a resolve never to abandon the struggle to follow the path of love” 
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(2009: 151). The transforming power of that love is such that nothing can 
separate us from it – “neither hardship, nor distress, nor persecution, nor 
famine nor nakedness nor danger nor the sword”;  not despite these, but 
in the midst of them, “we are more than conquerors” (151, Romans 8:35-
37).   
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1 Ibid., 468. Chryssides quotes the creed from The United Reformed Church, Alternative Order for 
Service of Ordination, with Responses, Schedule D (revised, 1983). See also Gordon D. Kaufman 1993: 
317.  
2 “Compassion” means “suffering with”.  
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3 For some, “flourishing” might include having the right relationship with the God of classical theism, 
but this meaning is not available to the philosophers considered in this chapter because belief in the 
God of classical theism requires a theodicy of the kind which they cannot accept.  
 
